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INTRODUCTION
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,1 the United States Supreme Court memorably observed, almost orthogonally, that voting is “a fundamental
political right, because it is preservative of all rights.”2 Yick Wo was a
peculiar place for the Court to essentially announce what one could
* Charles S. Rhyne Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
** Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Fellow, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
We are very thankful to Jennifer Morgan, librarian at Maurer, for her help in locating government documents.
1. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
2. Id. at 370.
2019 Vol. 62 No. 3

809

Howard Law Journal
fairly characterize as a positive universal right of political participation. The case was not about voting but racial discrimination in the
laundry business.3 Chinese laundry operators were denied permits to
continue the operation of their laundry businesses by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors.4 The operators continued to operate their
business, were fined and eventually jailed.5 The issue before the Supreme Court was not whether they were improperly imprisoned, but
whether the ordinances, pursuant to which they were denied their permits, were administered in a racially discriminatory manner and thus
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6
Writing for the Court, Justice Matthews objected to the ordinances on the ground that they permitted the decision makers to exercise their discretion on mere whim, or what he branded “purely
personal and arbitrary power.”7 Justice Matthews argued that this unfettered discretion was contrary to the very freedom canonized by the
Reconstruction Amendments. In his words, “the very idea that one
man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any
material essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another,
seems intolerable in any country where freedom prevails.”8 Poignantly, considering that the Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified
only twenty years earlier, he analogized this system of decision-making unconstrained by any limits other than caprice as “the essence of
slavery itself.”9
To illustrate the truth of this proposition—that it is “intolerable”
that “one man may be compelled to hold . . . any material essential to
the enjoyment of life[ ] at the mere will of another”— Justice Matthews offered as his first example the “case of the political franchise of
voting.”10 This is a remarkable shift in the life of the nation and its
understanding of rights as conduits of liberty. Barely 20 years before,
a conception of freedom, as codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
focused only on the narrow question of free labor and economic
3. See id. at 366.
4. See id.
5. See Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts about Yick Wo, U. ILL.
L. REV. 1359, 1362 (2008).
6. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373. For a contrary view, see Chin, supra note 5.
7. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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agency in the marketplace.11 Yet by the time of Yick Wo, voting had
become “essential to the enjoyment of life.”12 To be sure, Justice Matthews acknowledged that voting is “not regarded strictly as a natural
right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its
will under certain conditions.”13 And he further conceded that a legislature may “adopt any reasonable and uniform regulations” to administer a political right or privilege.14 What a legislature may not do is
implement regulations that “should subvert or injuriously restrain”
these rights or privileges.15 Consequently, state courts may review
whether regulations “were or were not reasonable regulations, and accordingly valid or void.”16 For support, he cited a voting discrimination case, Monroe v. Collins,17 decided by the Ohio Supreme Court in
1867, before the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Yick Wo is a remarkable case, not least of which because the
Court deduced the principle that arbitrary deprivation of a fundamental right was incompatible with freedom. More importantly, the Court
understood voting as the archetypal example of a fundamental right
and expressed its fundamentality in the language of universality.
Though allowing that voting was not “strictly” a natural right, Justice
Matthews minimized the cost of that concession by imposing limits on
how the government could regulate the right.18 It was in this context
that Justice Matthews expressed the now iconic view that the right to
vote “is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.”19
Justice Matthews’s observation in Yick Wo had its most famous
expression almost one hundred years later in another landmark case,
Reynolds v. Sims,20 which examined the malapportionment of Alabama’s legislature. Citing Yick Wo, Chief Justice Earl Warren memorably exclaimed in Reynolds that “[u]doubtedly, the right of suffrage is
a fundamental matter in free and democratic society. Especially since
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is
11. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, sec. 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); see ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL,
FREE LABOR, FREE MEN (1970).
12. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665 (1867).
18. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
19. Id.
20. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”21 Following Reynolds and the malapportionment
cases, every state would have to draw its legislative districts consistent
with the constitutional maxim of one-person one-vote.22 Population
inequality in apportionment was a violation of the individual citizen’s
“right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner.”23
Yick Wo and Reynolds appear to stand for a fundamental axiom,
akin to a universal truth, at the heart of the American democratic experiment: voting is a positive, universal, and fundament right. As
Alex Keyssar put it in his definitive history of the right to vote: “the
image of a democratic United States is that of a nation with universal
suffrage.”24 However, to the extent that Yick Wo, Reynolds, and
other similar examples purport to offer a descriptive account of the
practice of democracy in the United States, that account is woefully
inaccurate. Consider some examples.
We are currently in the midst of a decentralized and unorganized
debate over the preconditions that states can impose as prerequisites
to democratic participation. Some argue that state laws requiring voters to present photographic voter identification at the polls or when
they register to vote before they are allowed to cast their ballots are
designed to impede the exercise of the right because they are not related (rationally or otherwise) to any legitimate or important state objective. Are these laws designed to facilitate the voter’s ability to
exercise the franchise in a free or unimpaired manner, or do they subvert or impede the right? Consider also North Carolina’s omnibus
voting reform law. The law eliminates same-day registration, straight
party voting, out-of-precinct voting, and teenage pre-registration.25 It
bars county election boards from ordering polls to stay open an extra
hour if problems arise.26 It shortens early voting days.27 Notably, the
21. Id. at 562.
22. Id. at 589–90 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“In these cases the Court holds that seats in the
legislatures of six States are apportioned in ways that violate the Federal Constitution. Under the
Court’s ruling it is bound to follow that the legislatures in all but a few of the other 44 States will
meet the same fate.”).
23. Id. at 562.
24. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES xx (Basic Books 2009).
25. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 217–18 (4th Cir.
2016).
26. See id.
27. See id.
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56-page law was passed in the last 72 hours of the 2013 General Assembly.28 Similar laws have passed across the states.29
In a different vein, consider the modern debate about political
gerrymandering. Should the government be permitted to draw lines
in a way that maximizes the electoral prospects of the party in charge
of the line-drawing and minimizes the electoral prospects of the opposing party? Should the government be allowed to move voters in or
out of districts in order to dilute their vote simply because the voters
are likely to vote against the government’s preferences?
Finally, consider debates about the denial of the vote to certain
classes of people. United States citizens living in Puerto Rico have
neither a right to vote for a member of Congress nor are they not
entitled to representation in the Electoral College.30 This is because
Puerto Rico is not a state and federal representation remains largely
within state authority. Similarly, residents of the District of Columbia
cannot vote for members of Congress but can vote for presidential
electors by grace of the Twenty-Third Amendment. And felons or exfelons, even if citizens of the United States, may be denied the right to
vote in both federal and state elections.31
The Court’s declaration in Reynolds, and by extension Yick Wo,
assumed that voting was a right and declared confidently that the right
was fundamental. But American democratic practice has yet to reconcile itself with the lofty theoretical language of universality and fundamentality expressed in Reynolds and Yick Wo. Since at least the
advent of the Voting Rights Act, we have generally viewed our struggles about voting through the prism of race. This is, in part, because
voting and political participation in the United States have always
been imbricated with the struggle for racial equality.32 The history of
voting in the United States and the struggle for racial equality are not
the same phenomena, but they are related. In fact, we argue that one
28. See William Wan, Inside the Republican Creation of the North Carolina Voting Bill
Dubbed the ‘Monster’ Law, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/polit
ics/courts_law/inside-the-republican-creation-of-the-north-carolina-voting-bill-dubbed-the-mon
ster-law/2016/09/01/79162398-6adf-11e6-8225-fbb8a6fc65bc_story.html.
29. See Max Garland et al., New Voting Laws in the South Could Affect Millions of African
Americans, NBC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/new-votinglaws-south-could-affect-millions-african-americans-n639511; Ari Berman, The GOP War on Voting, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 30, 2011), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/thegop-war-on-voting-242182/.
30. Igartua De La Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2000).
31. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974).
32. Is it simply an accident of history that Yick Wo, the case in which the Court declares the
fundamentality of voting is a case about racial discrimination?
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cannot understand the scope and contours of the legal status of voting
apart from race. Race has mediated our engagement with voting.
In this brief history of race and voting in the United States, we
look at five distinctive yet interrelated moments. The first is the
founding period, a moment when the framers put our constitutional
structure in place and set the initial federalist calculus in favor of the
existing states.33 This is perhaps the most important moment in the
story. The framers chose to allow the states to define the criteria for
voting qualifications for federal elections.34 Instead of uniformity and
centralization, they opted for diversity and decentralization.35 This is
a choice that reverberates to this day. The second moment is the Civil
War and Reconstruction, a moment acknowledged by many as a time
when congressional leaders reset the federalism calculus towards the
national government. The third moment is the expected retrenchment
by the turn of the century, beginning in 1890 with the Mississippi plan.
The fourth is the Second Reconstruction, which, for our purposes,
culminated in the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The final
moment is the concomitant retrenchment, exemplified by the recent
Shelby County36 decision, and what commentators have labeled the
new voter suppression. We take up each moment in turn.
From this brief history, we distill three lessons. First, we underscore that this is not a whiggish history of inevitable progress. Second,
this is a story that highlights the underappreciated role of social movements, the complementary role played by the United States Supreme
Court, and the limits of constitutional norms, even explicit ones. Finally, and what we take to be the most important point of this history:
The history of the right to vote in the United States is a history of
battles over political power fought on a distinctively racialized canvas.
Race has been the archetype for our understanding of voting. This is
crucial if under-appreciated. Rather than debate the merits or costs of
expanding political rights, we have instead litigated these issues on
racial terms. There has been a distinctive benefit of viewing questions
of voting and political participation through the lens of race. It is because of our thinking about race and voting that we as a society are
slowly coming to the realization that restrictions on voting and politi33. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
34. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, sec. 2.
35. Id. (illustrating that the new national government placed on the states the authority to
define who “the people” were).
36. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
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cal participation are hard to justify, whether they implicate race or
not. It is thus ironic, as we conclude, that because of race, we are
slouching toward universality.
I. THE FIRST MOMENT: THE FOUNDING,
REPRESENTATION AND OUR FEDERALISM
The original U.S. Constitution – understood as the document ratified in 1787 plus the Bill of Rights – is curiously silent on the nature
and scope of the nascent American political community. Though surprising to modern political sensibilities, the original Constitution says
precious little about the right to vote. This silence is consistent with
the amount of time the convention delegates devoted to the issue.
The delegates focused on the defect of the existing confederation,
such as securing against foreign invasion, checking the quarrels between the states, and failing to attain any advantages that their union
would bring.37 These were all classic defects inherent to collective action. Drawing the political boundaries of the new nation – that is,
deciding how far to extend the right to vote – was not at the forefront
of the debates.
The Constitutional Convention reached a quorum and opened for
business on May 25.38 And for the first two months, convention delegates took up and debated the big questions.39 Finally, on July 26, the
day before the convention recessed for two weeks, the issue finally
arose.40 George Mason moved “that the Committee of detail be instructed to receive a clause requiring certain qualifications of landed
property & citizenship 〈of the U. States〉 in members of the Legislature.”41 Mason also moved to disqualify anyone “having unsettled
Accts. with or being indebted to the U. S.” from serving in the new
Congress.42 These proposals went to the heart of the delegates’ conceptions of political equality. Should the Constitution set any limits
on the political community, on either the electors or the elected? And
more importantly, what role should property ownership play in this
debate? This was no idle question. The question was not whether the
37. MAX FARRAND, ED., THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 4 vols.,
rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1937, repr. 1966).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 VOL. 2 121
(Max Farrand ed., 1911).
42. Id.
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right to vote was a right of citizenship – it was – but how to properly
define citizenship, or how to determine the necessary attachment to
the community. Property qualifications were prevalent across the colonies.43 More importantly, property ownership demonstrated the requisite independence and free will that all voters must have.
It is here when we first see a discussion of voting qualifications by
the convention delegates. It came in the form of Gouverneur Morris’
brief answer to Mason’s proposal: “If qualifications are proper, he wd.
prefer them in the electors rather than the elected.”44 James Madison
agreed on this point, “in thinking that qualifications in the Electors
would be much more effectual than in the elected.”45 But this would
not be an easy task, Madison recognized, due to “[the difficulty of]
forming any uniform standard that would suit the different circumstances & opinions prevailing in the different States.”46 John Dickinson similarly remarked that he “was agst. any recital of qualifications
in the Constitution. It was impossible to make a complete one, and a
partial one would by implication tie up the hands of the Legislature
from supplying the omissions.”47 While agreeing that this point had
some merit, Dickinson argued that “The best defense lay in the freeholders who were to elect the Legislature. Whilst this Source should
remain pure, the public interest would be safe. If it ever should be
corrupt, no little expedients would repel the danger.”48
The delegates accepted the first part of Mason’s resolution as
amended by Madison to strike out the word “landed” from the proposal.49 This meant that the convention delegates were in favor of
property and citizenship qualifications for voting. In contrast, the
convention rejected the second part of Mason’s proposal, disqualifying debtors and those with “unsettled accounts.”50
The Committee of Detail took up the convention’s work the next
day, July 27, and met for two weeks.51 The five committee members
43. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, 168
(1969); Sean Wilentz, Property and Power: Suffrage Reform in the United States, 1787–1860, in
VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF VOTING AND
VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA 31 (Donald W. Rogers & Christine Scriabine eds., 1992).
44. FARRAND, supra note 41, at 121.
45. Id. at 124.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 123.
48. Id. at 123.
49. Id. at 124.
50. FARRAND, supra note 41, at 126.
51. Id. at 129.
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met behind closed doors. They made clear the nature of their work on
August 6, when they delivered a report of their work to the full convention. Notably, their draft began as follows:
We the People of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York,
New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, NorthCarolina, South-Carolina and Georgia do ordain, declare and establish the following Constitution for the Government of ourselves and
of our Posterity.52

This is the draft of language that would become the preamble to
the Constitution. At this stage in the process, this would be a union of
states. Within a few weeks, “we the people” would provide its consent
instead.
Of particular interest to us is Article IV of the draft report. In
language familiar to modern ears, the committee of detail offered the
following under section 1:
The members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen
every second year, by the people of the several States comprehended within this Union. The qualifications of the electors shall be
the same, from time to time, as those of the electors in the several
States, of the most numerous branch of their own legislatures.53

This language clearly rejects the first part of Mason’s resolution,
which called for property and citizenship qualifications. The report
also provided age, citizenship, and residency qualifications for membership in the new House of Representatives.54 This language contravened the Mason resolution.
As expected, the delegates aligned on the same two camps.
Gouverneur Morris first moved to strike the sentence about voter
qualifications and instead to add language “which wd. restrain the
right of suffrage to freeholders.”55 Otherwise, he argued, those without property “will sell [their votes] to the rich who will be able to buy
them.”56 John Dickinson concurred, as he “considered [freeholders]
as the best guardians of liberty.”57 To his mind, a property qualifica52. Id. at 177.
53. Id. at 178.
54. Id. (“Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of twenty five
years at least; shall have been a citizen of [in] the United States for at least three years before his
election; and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State in which he shall be
chosen.”).
55. Id. at 201.
56. FARRAND, supra note 41, at 202.
57. Id.
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tion would be “a necessary defense against the dangerous influence of
those multitudes without property & without principle.”58 James Wilson disagreed; not only had this language been “well considered by
the Committee,” and difficult to improve, but it would also be hard to
establish a uniform voter qualifications rule to apply across the
states.59 But this was “neither great nor novel,” Gouverneur Morris
responded.60 Morris then raised a further objection: that the clause
would improperly place the qualifications for voting for the national
legislature in the hands of the states.61
The debate took up the rest of the day and the next.62 Many
delegates rose in defense of the language of the report.63 Some delegates made a practical argument. They looked ahead to the upcoming
ratification process and the need to secure popular approval of the
work of the convention. According to Pierce Butler, for example,
“There is no right of which the people are more jealous than that of
suffrage.”64 As such, Oliver Ellsworth argued that “The people will
not readily subscribe to the National Constitution, if it should subject
them to be disfranchised.”65 And George Mason similarly offered
that “Eight or nine States have extended the right of suffrage beyond
the freeholders. What will the people there say, if they should be disfranchised.”66 More generally, Ben Franklin suggested that denying
the “lower classes” of the right to vote “would debase their spirit and
detach them from the interest of the country.”67
In response, Madison recognized the right to vote as “certainly
one of the fundamental articles of republican Government,” and so
the right “ought not to be left to be regulated by the Legislature.”68
He further argued that “the freeholders of the Country would be the
safest depositories of Republican liberty.”69 Dickinson agreed, since
“‘[n]o one could be considered as having an interest in the government unless he possessed some of the soil.”70 Gouverneur Morris ad58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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ded that to allow all freemen to vote would lead to aristocracy.71
Madison agreed.72
In the end, most of the delegates accepted the committee’s recommendation.73 Federalism won out. Under Article I, the delegates
entrusted the states to extend the right to vote to those electors with
the “qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch
of the state legislature.”74 This was a curious choice. The new national government placed on the states the authority to define who
“the people” were. And just as curiously, convention delegates never
proffered an argument in favor of uniform national suffrage, or at the
very least, an argument for a new constitutional right to vote more
expansive and inclusive than what the states were presently doing.
This choice also meant that national citizenship in the new nation
would be divorced from the right to vote.
This was a crucial choice. In the parlance of modern voting rights
law, this was the classic choice between rights and structure. The
framers placed structure – federalism – over rights, and in so doing,
they made a clear judgment about the value and meaning of the
franchise in the new nation. To be sure, it is true that this was a decision driven less by ideology than practical considerations. As Alexander Keyssar explained in his magisterial history of the right to vote,
“[a]ny national suffrage requirement was likely to generate opposition
in one state or another, and a narrow national suffrage, such as a freehold qualification, seemed capable of derailing the Constitution altogether.”75 But as we move forward in this history of race and voting,
it bears asking, what values are expressed by placing federalism at the
heart of American Democracy? More importantly, is federalism a
part of our constitutional DNA forever? Or can these values and
meanings subsequently change at some point in history?
II.

THE SECOND MOMENT: OF FREEDOM
AND RECONSTRUCTION

In the summer of 1862, President Lincoln took the first step towards the emancipation of the slave population across the Confederate states. This is when he penned the draft of what ultimately
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
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became the Emancipation Proclamation.76 Under the Proclamation,
signed on January 1, 1863, President Lincoln freed the slave population across the United States, save for slaves who resided in Unioncontrolled areas (such as New Orleans) or in the Border States who
remained in the Union (Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri). Within three years, the Thirteenth Amendment extinguished
slavery across the nation.77
The end of slavery raised important questions about the meaning
of freedom. What does it mean to be free? Is freedom simply the
absence of chains? This was President Johnson’s position, which led
him, time and again, to clash with Congressional Republicans. To the
President, the Thirteenth Amendment was the climax of Reconstruction, the end of the national government’s duties towards the freedmen. To Congressional Republicans, however, freedom required
much more. They could point to the immediate rise of the Black
Codes and peonage as proof that the resettlement of the freed population required more than President Johnson allowed. Freedom required the enforcement of rights and a state apparatus committed to
that enforcement.
Within a year, congressional Republicans gave us their answer.
Soon, before adjourning in March of 1865, the 38th Congress adopted
the Freedmen’s Bureau bill, to which “more than any other institution, fell the task of assisting at the birth of a free labor society.”78
The Bureau was established in order to aid former slaves in matters of
food, housing, education, health care and land ownership.79 The Bureau would exist for only a year, a time after which the freedmen
would no longer need its assistance to join American society.80 Naturally, President Johnson vetoed the original bill, and Congressional
Republicans failed to override it.81 Congress enacted a revised version four months later and overrode the expected presidential veto.82
The following year, Republicans enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1866, a measure designed “to protect all Persons in the United States
76. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 362–65 (1995).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
78. ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
142 (2005).
79. Id. at 243.
80. Id.
81. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 421, 915–17 (1866).
82. Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3349
(1866).
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in their Civil Rights and furnish the Means of their Vindication.”83
This was the Republicans’ first attempt to provide substantive meaning to the Thirteenth Amendment. To be free meant to be equal
before the law and to possess civil rights. This was a crucial point.
Republicans agreed that the Act protected the “fundamental rights”
of American citizenship. They were less certain about what these
rights specifically entailed. On its terms, the Act protected the right
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence,
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizensÉ84

To be free, in other words, meant to be a free agent in the economic sphere. This definition lay at the heart of the free labor ideology central to the ethos of the Republican Party. President Johnson
disagreed with this definition and vetoed the bill.85 Republicans overrode his veto.86
Notable for our purposes is the fact that the Civil Rights Bill did
not explicitly include political rights among its protections. In fact,
Republicans assured their colleagues that they would not extend the
right to vote to the freedmen. But this would not do. Republicans
well understood that the settlement of the war question demanded
political agency to the freedmen as a corollary to readmission of the
Confederate states to the Union. Under terms of Presidential Reconstruction, the Southern states need only repeal their secession ordinances, repudiate all confederate debts, and adopt the 13th
Amendment.87 Were the Southern states to return to the Union on
these terms, however, Republicans and Northern interests would be in
a worse place than prior to the war. This is because of the three-fifths
compromise, which gave slave states political power in reference to
the number of slaves that resided within their borders. The 13th
Amendment nullified the three-fifths compromise and would thus enhance the representation of the Confederate states in the House of
Representatives and the Electoral College.88 To allow the Southern
states to return to the Union without guaranteeing political rights to
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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the freedmen would essentially expand the political power of these
states in national politics. The war would have been fought for
nothing.
Republicans were aware of this conundrum. They were also
aware, however, that Northern states refused to extend voting rights
to the freedmen, and proposals to do so in a number of these states
had been recently defeated.89 One possible answer was to grant the
ballot to Southern Blacks alone, but only the radical Republicans in
Congress supported this solution. The Republicans were in a bind.
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction found a way out of this puzzle by “an ingenious contrivance worthy of a better cause.”90 Under
the Amendment, the states remained free to disenfranchise its Black
population at will. Under section 2 of the Amendment, however,
their representation in Congress and the Electoral College would be
reduced in proportion to the number of disenfranchised male citizens
of the state over 21 years of age.91 This solution would essentially
penalize the Southern states for disenfranchising its population but
not the North, whose Black population was too small for this penalty
to matter. Frederick Douglass referred to this strategy as “compromising and worthless.”92
The following year, Congress took a path to Black enfranchisement far more direct than believed possible in 1866. This was the Reconstruction Act of 1867.93 The Act is best known for establishing
military rule across the Confederate states.94 More important for us is
Section 5 of the Act, its suffrage provision.95 Under this section, readmission to the Union required the Confederate states to enfranchise
all its male citizens over 21-years-old, irrespective of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude, and who have resided in the states for
one year prior to the election.96 This was a conservative pragmatic
approach to the problem at hand; the Act extended black suffrage
89. WANG XI, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE AND NORTHERN REPUBLI1860–1910, at 45–46 (1997).
90. JAMES B. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 514
(2nd ed. 1992).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2.
92. Frederick Douglass, At Last, At Last, the Black Man has a Future: An Address Delivered
in Albany, New York, on 22 April 1870, ALB. EVENING J., Apr. 23, 1870 [hereinafter “At Last”].
93. 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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only to the Southern states, not to the nation as a whole.97 And yet,
the turnaround from the prior year is nothing short of remarkable.
Foner explains it as follows:
The astonishingly rapid evolution of Congressional attitudes that
culminated in Black suffrage arose both from the crisis created by
the obstinacy of Johnson and the white South, and the determination of Radicals, blacks, and eventually Southern Unionists not to
accept a Reconstruction program that stopped short of this
demand.98

Black suffrage, in other words, was both a response to the exigencies created by the politics of the day and a paean to racial equality.
These two arguments happily converged in 1867 and into the future.
But only to a point. Would Congress extend the tenets of the ’67 Act
and the implied promise of Section 2 of the 14th Amendment across
the nation? More importantly, would Congress secure the rights afforded by the ’67 Act through a constitutional amendment that would
apply to the nation as a whole? These were not idle questions. Without an amendment to the constitution, future majorities may wrest
away the hard-fought gains for Black rights. A new Amendment, enshrining Black suffrage, was needed.
Republicans recognized the difficulties ahead. They may well
have sought to enfranchise the Black population in the North in order
to strengthen its power, particularly in areas where political power
was evenly divided.99 Doing so, however, threatened to alienate core
Republican constituencies who opposed Black enfranchisement.100
As a result, the draft of the Amendment passed by Congress on February 26, 1869 and sent to the states for ratification reflected the most
conservative proposal debated by the body.101 One proposal affirmed
the right by all male citizens over 21 years of age to vote.102 A second
proposal forbids states to deny its citizens the right to vote on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and it further forbid
the use of literacy tests, property or nativity qualifications for voting.
A final proposal was the now-familiar ban on race, color and previous
97. Id.
98. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 78, at 277.
99. See WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1969).
100. See LaWanda Cox & John H. Cox, Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography, 33 J. S. HIST. 303 (1967).
101. WANG XI, supra note 89.
102. Id.
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condition of servitude as a voting prerequisite.103 This was the proposal sent to the states for ratification, and ratified to the states on
March 30th.104
Passage of the 15th Amendment led supporters of Black suffrage
to hail its promise. In a special message to Congress, President Grant
remarked that “the adoption of the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution completes the greatest civil change and constitutes the most
important event that has occurred since the nation came into life.”105
Passage of the Amendment was seen as the nation’s second founding.
Wendell Phillips, the Massachusetts abolitionist, argued that the
Amendment marked the real birthday of the nation because the Declaration of Independence finally applied to all.106 And to the question, “what does this Fifteenth Amendment mean to us?” Frederick
Douglass answered:
I will tell you. It means that the colored people are now and will be
held to be, by the whole nation, responsible for their own existence
and their well or ill being. It means that we are placed upon an
equal footing with all other men, and that the glory or shame of our
future is to be wholly our own.107

This was a common refrain. Passage of the Fifteenth Amendment commonly meant that Black Americans were finally in charge of
their own destinies. They were finally free. The Amendment, declared James Garfield, “confers upon the African race the care of its
own destiny. It places their fortunes in their own hands.”108 Only
now could Reconstruction finally be over. Or in the words of the New
York Tribune, “Let us have done with Reconstruction. . . . The country is tired and sick of it. . . . LET US HAVE PEACE.”109
The achievement of Reconstruction in this context could not be
understated. Only a generation ago, in Dred Scott, the U.S. Supreme
Court had declared that Black Americans could not be United States
citizens.110 In a scant five years after the war, the country had not
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. UVA: MILLER CENTER, March 30, 1870: Announcement of Fifteenth Amendment Ratification, inhttps://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-30-1870-announce
ment-fifteenth-amendment-ratification.
106. WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 1869–1879, at 23 (1979).
107. At Last, supra note 92.
108. ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
149 (2005).
109. David Blight, Professor, Yale Univ., Lecture on The Civil War and Reconstruction Era,
1845-1877.
110. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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only rejected Dred Scott’s central holding, but it had also placed Black
Americans on a plane of equality that few could imagine a few years
earlier. The numbers tell a poignant story. At the height of Reconstruction, two-thirds of all eligible Black voters cast ballots for presidential and gubernatorial elections.111 More importantly, these new
voters helped elect record numbers of candidates to public office –
324 members of Congress and state legislatures in 1872 alone.112 This
figure amounted to 15% of all Southern officeholders.113
The Fifteenth Amendment is generally understood as responsible
for this remarkable feat. This is clearly wrong, however, or at best
incomplete. The freedmen registered and came to the polls in historic
numbers, so much is true. But the leading reason for this was the
Reconstruction Act of 1867 and its demand of Black enfranchisement
as a pre-condition for readmission to the Union.114 This was key.
Blacks joined the American political community in the South because
the North so demanded it. In other words, mass enfranchisement was
a question of political will enforced through military rule. The Fifteenth Amendment sought to extend the promise of the ’67 Act, but it
did so in a very different way. The Reconstruction Act essentially
forced the Southern states to enfranchise all eligible male Black voters. The Fifteenth Amendment established instead a negative right:
race may not be the basis for regulating the franchise. The need for a
stronger enforcement arm became clear almost immediately. Congress responded with a series of enforcement acts.115
As the Reconstruction Era came to a close and military rule
across the South ended, it became an open question whether the fragile commitment to Black voting would last. Frederick Douglass put it
best, in a speech he gave in 1875 on “the color question.”116 He
asked, “when this great white race has renewed its vows of patriotism
and flowed back into its accustomed channels . . . in what position will
this stupendous reconciliation leave the colored people?”117 He
asked, “when this great white race has renewed its vows of patriotism
111. J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions 135, in CONTROMINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE (Bernard Grofman
and Chandler Davidson eds. 1992).
112. Id. at 140 (table 1).
113. Id.
114. 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
115. Id.
116. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Color Question, July 5, 1875, in FREDERICK DOUGLASS
PAPERS.
117. Id.
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and flowed back into its accustomed channels . . . in what position will
this stupendous reconciliation leave the colored people?”118 Douglass
then asked the question at the heart of the Reconstruction project, a
question that remains with us to this day: “If war among the whites
brought peace and liberty to the blacks, what will peace among the
whites bring?”119 He was not optimistic. “The signs of the times are
not all in our favor.”120 His words proved prescient.
III.

THE UNWINDING OF RECONSTRUCTION

The Reconstruction settlement was deeply intertwined with the
electoral fortunes of the Republican Party. Passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Congress and the various Reconstruction Acts made
sense in reference to the outcome of the election of 1866. However,
by the fall of 1867, signs of trouble surfaced, specifically in Ohio,
where Republicans proffered a referendum to amend their state constitution in support of Black suffrage, hoping to begin a domino effect
for Black suffrage across the North. Instead, Ohio voters rejected the
amendment.121 Black equality remained a mirage in Republican
minds.
By 1874, Democrats had reversed Republican majorities in what
may be described as “an electoral tidal wave.”122 Democrats turned a
110-seat deficit in the House into a 6-seat majority.123 They also won
many gubernatorial races across the North and the Midwest, from
New Hampshire and Massachusetts to Indiana and Illinois.124 Republicans still held on to the White House and the US Senate, but Democratic victories across the states ensured that Republicans would lose
seats in the Senate. To be sure, the Depression of 1873 explains these
changed political fortunes. But whatever the reason, it remained to be
seen how the new political landscape would affect the Reconstruction
agenda.
The winds of public opinion were shifting, and the U.S. Supreme
Court took notice. From the moment the Court got a chance to
render its verdict on the nascent Reconstruction policy, it offered a
narrow and almost unrecognizable account of Republican policymak118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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ing. These were the Slaughterhouse Cases.125 In Slaughterhouse, the
Court agreed that the 14th Amendment had been enacted as a way to
protect Black rights.126 Yet the Court further concluded that the
Amendment only protected the rights of national, not state, citizenship.127 These were a very limited set of rights. This meant that the
Amendment did not alter the calculus of our traditional federalism;
that is, the states remained in charge of protecting their citizens and
their rights. This is a curious reading of the Amendment, for as Justice Field noted in dissent, if this were its proper meaning, “it was a
vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage.”128 This
cannot possibly be the extent of the jewel of Reconstruction. The
Court, which was staffed by Lincoln and Grant nominees and confirmed by Republican majorities, had essentially narrowed the
Amendment into something that few Republicans could recognize.
The tide of public opinion was clearly shifting.
Three years later, the Court went further. In U.S. v. Cruikshank,129 the justices overturned three convictions that resulted from
the Colfax massacre, in which a white mob killed and wounded
around 100 Blacks residents of Colfax, Louisiana.130 The federal government brought indictments under the Enforcement Act of 1870.131
And once again, federalism ruled the day. Technically, the Court
based its holding partly on the fact that the government failed to single out race as the motivation behind the rioters’ conduct.132 But far
more important was the Court’s view that the postwar Amendments
were subject to a state action requirement; that is, the Amendments
may only be deployed against the actions of states, not private actors.133 This meant that the responsibility for protecting citizens from
crimes perpetrated by individuals remained with the states and local
governments. In postwar America, as the Court must have known,
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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this meant that crimes against the Black community would go unpunished. The justices noted that the national government retained the
authority to protect national rights, but as the Slaughterhouse Cases
held, this subset of rights was narrow in nature and almost inconsequential.134 They were meaningless. In the meantime, private acts of
terror, the issue of the day, remained unpunished.
The same day the Court decided Cruikshank, it also decided U.S.
v. Reese, a case that bears directly on our story.135 Reese involved a
constitutional challenge to a Kentucky law that required, among other
things, the payment of a poll tax, which the city of Lexington had set
at $1.50.136 Many Black residents could not pay the tax, and those
who tried to pay it were often refused.137 Plaintiffs brought a challenge under the prohibitions with the interference of the right to vote
under sections 3 and 4 of the Enforcement Act of 1870.138 The Supreme Court brushed this challenge aside.139 As with Slaughterhouse
and Cruikshank, our federalism carried the day. According to the
Court, the Fifteenth Amendment did not give Congress plenary power
over elections; such powers remained with the states.140 Rather, the
Amendment gave Congress the power to prohibit racial discrimination in voting.141 As such, the Court struck down sections 3 and 4 of
the Act as beyond the power of Congress. These sections had been
drafted so broadly as to cover any imaginable instance where Blacks
had been denied the right to vote, for whatever reason. This was precisely what Congress could not do.
Taken together, these cases paved the way for the betrayal of Reconstruction and the abandonment of Blacks by the national government. They paved the way, in other words, for the rise of Jim Crow.
This is how Charles Warren put it, in his influential history of the
Court:
Viewed in historical perspective now, there can be no question that
the decisions in these cases were most fortunate. They largely eliminated from National politics the negro question which had so long
embittered congressional debates; they relegated the burden and
134.
135.
136.
137.

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 82.
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the duty of protecting the negro to the States, to whom they properly belonged; and they served to restore confidence in the National
Court in the Southern States.142

The Court had placed the states once again in charge of protecting the rights of its colored citizenry. It was as if Reconstruction never
happened. This was the moment Frederick Douglass had feared.
A roadblock remained. The Court recognized that the design of
the Reconstruction Amendments was “to protect an emancipated
race, and to strike down all possible legal discriminations against those
who belong to it.”143 This was the clear lesson of Reconstruction. The
states must stay away from explicit racial classifications that discriminate against the Black population as a class. The Court made this
point clearly. In Strauder v. West Virginia144, a case decided on the
heels of the Slaughterhouse Cases and soon before the Civil Rights
Cases145, the Court struck down a state law that explicitly barred
Blacks from participating in juries. In so doing, the Court pointed the
way to the future. States shall not use race as the basis to form their
jury pools, so much was clear. However, the Court continued, this
was not to say that the Court may not “make discriminations.”146 For
example, states “may confine the selection to males, to freeholders, to
citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational qualifications. We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment
was ever intended to prohibit this.”147 In other words, states may not
explicitly bar blacks from voting, or from juries, or from the exercise
of civil rights more generally. But proxies would work just as well,
and the U.S. Constitution and federal law would not stand in their
way.
IV.

THE THIRD MOMENT: VOTE SUPPRESSION IN THE
SHADOW OF THE 15TH AMENDMENT

“The government, which made the black man a citizen of the
United States,” Senator Lodge told his colleagues, “is bound to protect him in his rights as a citizen of the United States and it is a cowardly government if it does not do it. No people can afford to write
142.
(1923).
143.
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145.
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147.
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anything into their constitution and not sustain it.”148 He was speaking in direct reference to the Lodge Election Bill of 1890, a measure
intended to protect black voters in their exercise of rights seemingly
protected by the 15th Amendment.149 For almost as soon as the
Northern commitment to Reconstruction ended, the presence of
Black voters in Southern registration lists dropped dramatically.
White-only governments across the South accomplished this retrenchment through fraud and violence. The Lodge Bill was an effort to
enforce an explicit constitutional command.
Supported by President Harrison and Republican majorities in
Congress, the bill authorized the national supervision of federal elections. Upon petition by 100 or more voters within a congressional
district, the bill authorized a circuit court judge to appoint federal supervisors on a bipartisan basis, whose duty was to watch and report on
election procedures.150 The Circuit Court was further authorized to
decide disputes over the election, as well as begin investigations of
persons charged with electoral fraud, bribery or intimidation.151 The
bill applied to all congressional districts across the country.152 Its purpose, according to Senator Lodge, was to “[m]ake public all the facts
relating to elections, to protect the voters and to render easy the punishment of fraud.”153
The critics were unconvinced. They labeled the legislation a
“force bill” and traced it back to measures from the Reconstruction
era. The arguments were familiar: the bill was a sectional measure,
intended to target the South; it would be costly; it would impose severe penalties; and, above all else, it would threaten state sovereignty.
To be sure, racism and the explicit threat to white supremacy motivated some critics of the bill, particularly in the South. But it is also
true that partisan motives played a role as well. Fair and honest elections would threaten up to 30 congressional seats then in Democratic
hands.154
148.
149.
150.
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151.
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The bill succumbed to a filibuster.155 Its defeat sent a clear signal
that the national government would no longer protect the voting
rights of Black Americans. In the wake of the bill’s defeat, the promise of Reconstruction ended tragically. Black voters were removed
from the voting rolls almost as quickly as they had joined them. This
disenfranchisement happened all across the South, between the years
1890 and 1910, in a world where the Fifteenth Amendment was good
law.156 The political strategies varied across the states.
The leading practice, though by no means the most effective, was
the poll tax and its requirement that eligible voters pay a capitation
tax as a pre-condition to voting.157 States also began to experiment
with periodic voting registration requirements.158 Even if applied
neutrally, these requirements significantly suppress voter turnout.
But these were not neutral requirements. The states required very
specific levels of information, and any mistake—no matter how insignificant—would invalidate the application.159 They also set specific
days and times for registration. And once registered, a prospective
voter must bring his registration certificate to the polling place.160
Above all these changes and requirements, these new Southern registration laws granted great amounts of discretion to local registrars.
This was key. The requisite neutrality in election administration gave
way to the whims and biases of local registrars across the region.
States also made a concerted effort to disenfranchise illiterate
persons. This strategy had the dual effect of removing both Black and
poor voters from the rolls. Most obviously, some states required applicants to read a section of the state or federal Constitution and to
occasionally explain to the registrar what they had read. Some states
also maintained separate boxes for each seat up for election and required voters to place his particular choice in the right box. Ballots
placed in the wrong box were not counted. This created an obvious
problem for illiterate voters, who could not read the boxes and thus
risked placing their ballots in the wrong box. The boxes were periodically rearranged in order to ensure that illiterate voters could not be
155. Jeffery A. Jenkins & Justin Peck, Legal History and Legislature: Building Toward Major
Policy Change: Congressional Action on Civil Rights, 1941-1950, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 143
(2012).
156. Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 305 (1998).
157. Id. at 309.
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assisted by friends prior to entering the voting place. Finally, states
also began to adopt the secret ballot. Prior to this time, political parties printed and distributed ballots.161 This practice allowed illiterate
voters to receive assistance prior to Election Day. The advent of the
secret ballot in the late 19th Century meant that voters must look up
and down the list printed by the government in order to find their
preferred candidate. This made the task of voting much more difficult
on illiterates, if not downright impossible. It also made the task far
more difficult on anyone who did not speak English fluently.
This era is commonly known as the first voter suppression period.
Most voter suppression practices date back to this period. These are
not only the aforementioned literacy tests and poll taxes, but also residency requirements, felon disenfranchisement laws, good character
clauses and, in due course, the white primary.162 As a safety valve to
ameliorate the over-inclusiveness of these practices, which swept
many whites as well, the states implemented the grandfather clause.
Though these exemptions varied, they generally allowed otherwise ineligible voters to vote if they were lineal descendants of a veteran of
war or anyone who voted prior to 1867.163 The wide discretion afforded local registrars also ensured that the burden of these new electoral restrictions fell hardest on the Black community.
Taken together, these various electoral changes had the desired
effect. The numbers tell a poignant picture. Reconstruction policies
had a salutary effect on Black political participation. Black voters
came to the polls and gained political office in numbers not seen again
until the 1990’s. For example, Blacks gained an electoral majority in
many states across the South and held elected office in record numbers – around 2,000 – at every level of government, from the U.S.
Senate to state Supreme Courts and local government.164 But the
electoral retrenchment took its toll. In Louisiana, for example, there
were 130,334 registered Black voters in 1896.165 After the new state
constitution took effect in 1898, the number of registered Black voters
dropped to 5,320.166 There were only 730 registered Black voters in
161.
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1910, or 0.5% of the eligible population.167 A similar disenfranchisement occurred across the Southern states. Alabama dropped from
181,315 registered Black voters to just 2,980 in 1903.168 Both Virginia
and North Carolina saw their estimated black voter turnout drop by
virtually 100%.169 These drops were consistent across the South.170
Advocates of Black political rights knew that they could not fight
back this suppression wave through the political branches. The defeat
of the Lodge Bill made clear that voting rights enforcement must happen outside of Congress. The only institution that offered any hope
was the federal judiciary. And that’s precisely where they went. The
case was Giles v. Harris.171
Jackson Giles was a literate, Republican Party activist, who held a
patronage job as janitor in the Montgomery, Alabama federal courthouse.172 Mr. Giles had been a registered voter from 1871 to 1901.173
He also happened to be Black.174 Ratification of the 1901 Alabama
state Constitution – “the most elaborate suffrage requirements that
have ever been in force in the United States”175 – thus ensured that
Mr. Giles would be removed from the registration lists.176 But Mr.
Giles was asking the Court to add his name and the names of 5,000
similarly situated black voters to the voting rolls.177 The Court refused, reasoning that if the plaintiff was in fact correct, “how can we
make the Court a party to the unlawful scheme by accepting it and
adding another voter to its fraudulent lists?”178 The Court offered a
second reason. The litigation was essentially a frontal attack on Jim
Crow and the mass disenfranchisement begun in 1890. In the Court’s
words, the complaint alleged “that the great mass of the white popula167. Id.
168. PEYTON MCCRARY ET AL., ALABAMA, IN QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965-1990, 38, 38–52 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard
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tion intends to keep the blacks from voting.”179 So much was clear.
The question for the Court was whether, if “the conspiracy and the
intent exist, a name on a piece of paper will . . . defeat them.”180 The
answer was just as clear, at least to a majority of the Court. An effective ruling for Mr. Giles, and black rights in general, required a commitment by the Court to “supervise” local elections. This was not a
role that the justices could see for themselves and the institution of
the Court in 1903. So, they punted.
Giles closed the last available door available for enforcing the
15th Amendment. The promise of black political rights died in its
wake. Looking to the future, it remained to be seen whether, and
how, the promises made in 1870 would ever become a reality.
V.

THE FOURTH MOMENT: THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION

Registering to vote in 1960 Louisiana was no easy task. First came
the technicalities of the process. A prospective voter must fill out an
application form.181 She would state her age in years, months, and
days; she would also state her gender and her race; her address; her
occupation; and her previous place of registration.182 The applicant
must fill out this form very carefully, for any mistake might lead the
registrar to reject the application. Further, under the state Constitution, an applicant must “establish that she is the identical person
whom [s]he represents [her]self to be when applying for registration.”183 If the registrar had “good reason to believe” that she was not
the same person, “he may require the applicant to produce two credible registered voters of his precinct to make oath to that effect.”184
Second came the literacy threshold. Under the Louisiana Constitution, a prospective voter must “be able to read any clause in this
Constitution, or the Constitution of the United States, and give a reasonable interpretation thereof.”185 The interpretation must be satis179.
180.
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factory to the registrar in her parish.186 Until 1960, Louisiana
applicants could demonstrate their literacy by filling out the application, and illiterate applicants could dictate the information to the registrar (though they must still pass the interpretation portion of the
registration).187 Beginning in 1960, under a law approved by state voters, illiterate persons could no longer register.188 Two years later, the
Louisiana State Board of Registration adopted a voter qualification
test.189 Under this test, an applicant must draw one of ten cards.190
Each card had six multiple choice questions, and the applicant must
answer four questions correctly in order to pass the test.191 Questions
included the name of the first U.S. President or the number of justices
on the U.S. Supreme Court.192
Finally, and also beginning in 1960, the registrant must show that
she was not a person of “bad character.”193 The law defined “bad
character” as, among other things, “living in a common law marriage
within 5 years prior to applying to vote;” giving birth to an illegitimate
child within 5 years immediately prior applying for registration, unless
the child was conceived “as a consequence of rape or forced carnal
knowledge;” or fathering an illegitimate child within 5 years immediately prior to applying for registration.194 The statutory definitions of
“bad character” were not all inclusive. The law further provided that
registrars may establish any of these definitions with “competent evidence,” a term that the law did not define.195
The registration process was further complicated by the many
techniques designed to keep voters from registering. For example, the
state would periodically purge voters from the voting rolls and then
ask them to re-register, at which point the state may retroactively
challenge any registrant it so chose.196 The state may also slow down
its registration process.197 Registration offices may only open once a
186. BATON ROUGE COMM. ON REGISTRATION EDUC., NEGRO VOTING IN LOUISIANA 9, 1ST
(1963).
187. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1965).
188. Voting Rights: A Case Study of Madison Parish, Louisiana, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 726, 744
(1971).
189. Louisiana, 380 U.S. at 154.
190. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 393.
191. Voting Rights, supra note 188, at 743.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 737 n.54.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 775–76.
197. Voting Rights, supra note 188, at 775–76.
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week, or once a month, or over the lunch hour, or at the discretion of
the local registrars.198 Voters may be threatened with violence or economic repercussions if they insisted on registering to vote.199 Voters
may also be explicitly denied the right to register to vote.200
The root of the problem was the tremendous amount of discretion placed on registrars throughout the process. This was how racial
bias creeped into the system. Consider how registrars administered
and evaluated the interpretation test. Registrars could choose the
level of difficulty for the question that any given applicant must answer. Registrars may also show applicants sample answers, or may
assist applicants in answering questions. In practice, white applicants
were generally asked to answer easier questions, saw sample answers,
and received assistance from the registrars. Black applicants did not.
Registrars also had ample discretion in evaluating the answers. A particularly egregious example saw a registrar ask a black applicant for an
interpretation of the Article X, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution,
which states: “Rolling stock operated in this State, the owners of
which have no domicile therein, shall be assessed by the Louisiana Tax
Commission, and shall be taxed for State purposes only, at a rate not
to exceed forty mills on the dollar assessed value.”201 The applicant
answered that “it means if the owner of which does not have residence
within the State, his rolling stock shall be taxed not to exceed forty
mills on the dollar.”202 This answer was rejected.203 In contrast, a registrar asked a white applicant to interpret Article 1, § 3 of the Louisiana Constitution.204 The applicant answered: “FRDUM FOOF
SPETGH.”205 The registrar accepted this interpretation.206
The raw data shows that these various strategies and provisions
worked as intended. In 1960, whites in Louisiana 21 years old and
older were 71.5% of the population, and non-whites were 28.5%.207
Yet whites accounted for 86.2% of registered voters, while non-whites
accounted for only 13.8%.208 The data at the parish level raised more
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
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questions. Four parishes with black populations between 61% and
66% had no black registered to vote at all.209 Fifteen parishes had
black voter registration under 10% of the voting age population.210
Seven parishes had between 10% and 24% of the black voting age
population registered.211 And thirteen parishes had between 25% and
49% of the black voting age population registered.212
These figures were consistent across the Deep South. In its 1961
report, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights concluded that “in about
100 counties in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee, there has been evidence, of varying degree, of discriminatory disenfranchisement.”213
More specifically, according to the commission, in 129 counties across
ten Southern states where blacks are more than 5% of the voting age
population, less than 10% of eligible black voters were registered to
vote.214 And in 23 counties in 5 of these states, no eligible Black voters were registered.215 The commission concluded: “So in 1961 the
franchise is denied entirely to some because of race and diluted for
many others. The promise of the Constitution is not yet fulfilled.”216
In his address at the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom on May 17,
1957, Dr. King was aware of this history.217 He told his audience that
“all types of conniving methods are still being used to prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters.”218 The speech came in the
midst of debates in Congress over the right to vote, debates that
culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Dr. King explained to his
audience that nothing had changed. He then urged President Eisenhower and members of Congress “to give us the right to vote.”219 This
is a remarkable address, not the least of which because Dr. King asked
the nation to give people of color the very thing that had been granted
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, supra note 181, at 133.
214. Id. at 111.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 135.
217. Amy Rogers Nazarov, In the Footsteps of Martin Luther King Jr. in Washington, WASH.
POST (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/in-the-footsteps-ofmartin-luther-king-jr-in-washington/2017/01/11/0e340cc4-c3d2-11e6-9578-0054287507db_story
.html?utm_term=.a3aa82b108ce.
218. Barbara Arnwine & John Nichols, Martin Luther King’s Call to ‘Give Us the Ballot’ is as
Relevant Today as it was in 1957, THE NATION (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/
martin-luther-kings-call-to-give-us-the-ballot-is-as-relevant-today-as-it-was-in-1957/.
219. Id.
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to them through the 15th Amendment. This is an arresting point. Reconstruction meant nothing. The settlement of Reconstruction and its
many promises to the freedmen, came to naught. The larger lesson is
clear: The Constitution is but a parchment promise absent the political
will to enforce its mandates. And just as importantly, Dr. King was
giving the nation a way to rid itself of its “people of color” problem.
If given the ballot, people of color would then take their political fortunes in their own hands. The careful reader will note that this was
not a new argument. This was the same argument made in 1870 by
leading political figures, from Frederick Douglass to James Garfield
and many others.220 Dr. King joined very distinguished company.
Progress had come slowly since the national government had abdicated its enforcement responsibility in the early Twentieth Century.
Most of the gains came through the courts. In 1915, the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down the grandfather clause in Guinn v. United States.221
And in 1927, the Court also truck down the Texas white primary in
Nixon v. Herndon.222 At first glance, these cases appear to contradict
the Court’s posture in Giles and its hesitation to take on the political
elites of its day. But this was not new terrain for the Court. These
cases were transparent attempts by the state to circumvent constitutional norms. The justices almost had no other choice. More crucially, the reach of the cases was small, almost trivial.223 Giles asked
the Court to overturn the entire voting registration regime in Alabama.224 In contrast, Oklahoma was the only state at the time with a
grandfather clause, and the white primary law at issue in Nixon was
the only one of its kind in the nation; all other states banned blacks
through party rule.225 These cases also failed to reach other disenfranchising practices; they were sui generis. And, just as importantly,
the cases did not question the legislative motives behind the challenged statutes, the kind of inquiries that would be needed in the future in order to address the voting suppression practices across the
South.
220. See discussion infra.
221. See generally Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 356–67 (1915).
222. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).
223. See Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV.
881, 919–21 (1998).
224. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903).
225. Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2001).
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Guinn and Nixon are important for a different reason. Almost as
soon as the Court issued its rulings, state actors responded in ways
that undermined the rulings. In Oklahoma, the legislature responded
by “grandfathering” the grandfather clause; that is, the new law provided for the automatic registration of anyone who voted in 1914,
while requiring all other eligible voters to register within a 12-day window or be forever disenfranchised.226 And the Texas legislature immediately passed a law that attempted to remove all traces of state
action from the white primaries.227 Rather than triumphs of judicial
review, they instead epitomize the ease by which judicial rulings could
be circumvented.228 The cases offered a blueprint for the future. The
Court could not do this important work alone.229
President Truman joined the fight for voting rights in 1946. In a
wire to the NAACP convention, Truman expressed his view that “the
ballot is both a right and a privilege.”230 More importantly, he told
the convention that the “right to use it must be protected and its use
by everyone must be encouraged.”231 The following year, and speaking from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, President Truman argued
that “[t]he National government must take the lead in safeguarding
civil rights. We cannot afford to delay action until the most backward
community has learned to prize civil liberty and has taken adequate
steps to protect the rights of all its citizens.”232 This was no idle talk.
In December 1947, the President’s Committee on Civil Rights issued
its report, To Secure These Rights, which highlighted the state of civil
rights violations in the country and the need for further action.233
Among its many recommendations, the report called for federal legislation to protect the right of eligible persons to participate in federal
elections, and for authorizing the Department of Justice to use civil
226. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 276 (1939).
227. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82–83 (1932); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45,
46–47 (1935).
228. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 86 (2004).
229. For the view that the understanding of the Court as a countermajoritarian hero is a
myth, and that “the Court’s capacity to protect minority rights is more limited than most justices
or scholars allow,” see Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1996).
230. STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944–1969, at
119 (1999).
231. Id. 119–20.
232. Id. 123.
233. See generally THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS (1947).
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and criminal sanctions in the protection of that right.234 This recommendation formed the basis, 10 years later, of the Civil Rights Act of
1957.
The ’57 Act was the first national civil rights law since Reconstruction. The legislation vested authority on the executive branch,
through the newly established civil rights division, to seek injunctive
relief “[w]henever any person has engaged or there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any person is about to engage” in acts that
would deprive the right to vote based on race.235 But the legislation
fell short of expectations. For one, officials within the Department of
Justice viewed their roles under the legislation very narrowly. They
wished for Southern acquiescence to the law and viewed prosecution
only as a last resort.236 Also, federal judges throughout the South
were recalcitrant to side with the federal government in these suits.237
Further, registration officials would resign before the lawsuit commenced, forcing the federal government to sue the state.238 But as the
lower courts concluded, the law authorized the Department of Justice
to bring suits against “persons,” not states.239 And just as importantly,
subpoenas for the voting records at the center of these suits were either ignored or blatantly defied.240 Files were destroyed or mysteriously disappeared.241 As a result, the ’57 Act was not nearly enough.
Even as the NAACP conducted many registration drives, the number
of eligible black voters rose a meager three percent, or just under
200,000.242 More work remained to be done.
Three years later, Congress corrected many of the deficiencies of
the ’57 Act. Specifically, the 1960 Act authorized lawsuits directly
against the states.243 Also, the Act required state voting officials to
preserve their voting record for twenty-two months and to allow the
234. Id. 107, 128.
235. The Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 131 (c), 71 Stat. 637 (1957) (current version
at 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2019)).
236. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
1959, at 131 (1959); see STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH,
1944-1969 at 333 (1976).
237. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
238. Id. at 130.
239. Id. at 137.
240. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS 1959, at 70-71, 81 (1959).
241. Id. at 134.
242. Lawson, supra note 236.
243. The Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 86-450, § 601 (b), 74 Stat. 92 (1960) (current version at
52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2019)).
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Attorney General and her representatives to inspect and photograph
them.244 The Act also permitted federal judges to appoint voting
referees to register voters whenever the finding of racial discrimination in voting is pursuant to a “pattern or practice.”245 As before,
however, these amendments depended both on the good will of federal judges across the South to enforce the law as well as the federal
government’s view of its own power and responsibilities, especially
the lawyers within the Department of Justice. The federal government appeared ready to do its part. In the five months after passage
of the ’60 Act, the Civil Rights Division began four voting cases,
which were one more than they had begun in the preceding two and a
half years.246 Private groups were also ready to do their part. Dr.
King, Roy Wilkins, and Philip Randolph agreed to jointly sponsor a
“nonpartisan crusade to register one million new Negro voters.”247 It
was not clear, however, how Southern federal judges would react to
the new law.
In November 1961, President Kennedy met with the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in order to receive a statutory report from the
commission. The commission took this opportunity to place the recent statutory achievements in historical context. The resulting report, Freedom to be Free, initially drafted by John Hope Franklin in
consultation with Rayford Logan, Allan Nevins, and C. Vann Woodward, came out two years later.248 The historians’ influence on the
report is unmistakable. The first line of the report points to the
Emancipation Proclamation as the starting point, as any text that examines the march from bondage to freedom in the United States
must.249 But almost as soon as 1863 is barely mentioned, the report
takes us back to 1619 and offers a “brief review of the slave’s struggle
for equality prior to emancipation.”250 The report then offers a brief
history of race and freedom, through Reconstruction and Redemption, to Jim Crow and the march in the Twentieth Century towards
equality.251 The end of this discussion details the many gains in racial
representation in government thanks to the Black community’s “new
244.
245.
246.
Act, 54
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
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political strength.”252 At the time of publication, the report noted that
Blacks “now held more elective offices than at any time since 1877.”253
Despite this achievement, the report concluded, more work remained
to be done.254 The problem of racial disenfranchisement continued.
At the heart of the problem, particularly in the South, was “resistance
to the established law of the land and to social change.”255
While the political branches and the bureaucracy continued to
debate their duties and responsibilities under the Reconstruction
power, the grassroots did not let on. The Voter Education Project,
under the direction of the Southern Regional Council, formed in 1962
and lasted for two and a half years.256 It raised and administered
monies raised towards registering eligible voters in the South, funds
that it then provided to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, the
Congress of Racial Equality, and the National Urban League.257
More directly, VEP also coordinated registration drives and activities.258 In 1964, civil rights groups, including CORE and SNCC, organized Freedom Summer, a voter registration drive aimed at
increasing the number of Black registered voters in Mississippi.259
The gains from these efforts were noticeable.
But these gains were not enough, nor were they a signal that the
problem of racial discrimination in voting had been solved. Congress
certainly did not think so, and so in 1964, they came back to the issue
as part of the omnibus Civil Rights Act. This new bill continued to
improve the traditional litigation avenues begun in 1957 while recognizing that local registrars had too much discretion to discriminate
against voters of color at will.260 In response, the ’64 Act made it unlawful to apply different standards, practices, and procedures from
those applied to successful applicants; it banned the use of immaterial
252. Id. at 189.
253. Id. (emphasis added).
254. Id. at 207.
255. Id.
256. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-1953, at
578 (1988)
257. Steven F. Lawson, Prelude to the Voting Rights Act: The Suffrage Crusade, 1962-1965, 57
S.C. L. REV. 889 (2006).
258. Id.
259. Id.; Lawson, supra note 236.
260. The Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101 (a), 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (current version
at 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2019)).
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mistakes in the application form as a reason to deny registration; and
it required that registration tests be administered in writing.261 The
Act also established the completion of sixth grade as a rebuttable
standard of literacy.262 The Act provided for three-judge courts with
direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.263
During his State of the Union address on January 4, 1965, President Johnson recognized that the fight against racial discrimination in
voting was not over.264 As he detailed the many challenges facing the
nation, from education and clean water and air to crime and “crippling disease,” President Johnson proposed as part of his national
agenda that “we eliminate every remaining obstacle to the right to
vote.”265 Later in the address, he asked that “a just nation throw open
. . . the city of promise” to those Americans “still trapped in poverty
and idleness and fear.”266 This promise included, for African Americans, the “enforcement of the civil rights law and elimination of barriers to the right to vote.”267 More work remained.
Two months later, on March 7, a group of marchers began a pilgrimage from Selma to Montgomery. They left Brown Chapel AME
Church and marched silently through downtown Selma. But they did
not make it past the Edmund Pettus Bridge. State and local officials
awaited them.268 And from the ashes of this tragic and unforgettable
moment arose the most important and effective civil rights statute in
our nation’s history, the Voting Rights Act.269
VI.

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

The Voting Rights Act reflected President Johnson’s directive to
the Department of Justice to “prepare the ‘goddamnedest toughest’
voting-rights bill possible.”270 Prior efforts to enforce the 15th
Amendment failed because they pursued a court-centric, individual
261. Id. § 101 (a).
262. Id. § 101 (b).
263. Id. § 101 (d).
264. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise, 1
Pub. Papers 87 (Mar. 15, 1965).
265. The Civil Rights Act, § 101 (d).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Howell Raines, MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH
REMEMBERED 337 (1977) (interview with Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General during the
Johnson Administration).
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rights approach to what was clearly a structural problem. These prior
efforts fell short, in the words of Attorney General Katzenbach, “tarnished by evasion, obstruction, delay, and disrespect.”271 This is how
Katzenbach explained the problem to a House subcommittee:
Our experience in the voting area has been that, no matter what is
decided by courts, no matter what is passed by Congress in this respect, every single place in some States, the only way you can get
compliance is to litigate and then that is defended, it is defended up
through every court procedure to the Supreme Court, no matter
how clear and obvious the points, no matter how many times those
same points have been decided, until you eventually get a decree.
Then the decree is examined carefully to see whether there is any
way in which a certain practice not explicitly prohibited by the decree can be engaged in for the same discriminatory purposes. When
this is done, and you go back to court to get the judge to broaden
the decree, his capacity and jurisdiction to do that is litigated, then
that is taken on appeal and that is taken to the Supreme Court.
When you run out of these things, the legislature enacts a new test
and that has to be litigated and appealed and go to the Supreme
Court.272

“What is required,” Katzenbach argued, “is a systematic, automatic method to deal with discriminatory tests, with discriminatory
testers, and with discriminatory threats.”273
The Act confronted the problem of racial discrimination in voting
in new and aggressive ways. The most powerful provisions of the Act
were Sections 4 and 5, the coverage formula and the preclearance provision. Under section 4(b), states who used literacy tests and had
voter registration or voter turnout rates below 50% would become
covered jurisdictions.274 And any such jurisdiction was subject to section 5 of the Act, its preclearance provision.275 This meant that any
“voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure with respect to voting” within these jurisdictions must be
approved by the federal government prior to implementation.276 The
Act also banned literacy tests from covered jurisdictions and provided
271. Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1, 5 (1965).
272. Id. at 41–42.
273. Id.
274. The Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4 (b), 79 Stat. 438 (1965) (current version
at 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2019)).
275. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, §§ 4-5, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965).
276. Id.
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for poll watchers and registrars.277 No longer could local registrars
stay ahead of the law and keep voters of color from joining the voting
rolls. Notably, these special provisions of the Act would last 5 years;
once voters of color were registered and able to vote, the need for the
law would wane.278
Central to the history of the Voting Rights Act is the fact that the
Court has generally treated the Act like a superstatute from the moment it first addressed the constitutionality of the Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.279 For Chief Justice Warren, the constitutionality
of the Act was not to be decided on the basis of a formalistic and rigid
understanding of both the statute and the Constitution, but “with reference to the historical experience which it reflects.”280 The Court
clearly viewed Congress as a partner in resolving the problem of racial
discrimination in voting that had plagued (and notice the personalization of the problem) “our country for nearly a century.”281
Undeniably, this was aggressive enforcement of the 15th Amendment. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,282 the Supreme Court upheld
the Act under a deferential standard of review.283 But in his opinion
for the Court, Chief Justice Warren made a strategic mistake. In attempting to quell criticism that the Act targeted Southern jurisdictions
as “conquered provinces,” Warren justified the aggressive nature of
the Act by pointing both to history and the legislative record.284 He
referred to the number of hearings in each congressional committee,
the total number of witnesses, the length of the debates in each chamber, and final vote tallies.285 From this “voluminous legislative history,” Warren reached two conclusions.286 First, he concluded that the
country faced “an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”287 And second, that “Congress
concluded” that past attempts to enforce the 15th Amendment had
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The
Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389 (2015).
280. Id. at 1406.
281. Id.
282. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
283. Charles & Fuentes-Rowher, supra note 279, at 1406–07.
284. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324.
285. See id. at 308–09.
286. Id. at 309.
287. Id.

2019]

845

Howard Law Journal
fallen woefully short and must be replaced by “sterner and more elaborate measures.”288 Warren then “paused” in order to “summarize
the majority reports of the House and Senate Committees, which document in considerable detail the factual basis for these reactions by
Congress.”289
Justice Brennan saw the problem immediately. In comments he
sent to the Chief Justice on the first circulated draft of the opinion,
Brennan questioned the need to justify the Act by pointing to the legislative record.290 Justifying the Act in 1965 was quite easy; one need
only open a newspaper or watch the news.291 Brennan knew that as
time passed, the evidence to justify the Act would not be as evident.
To be sure, the coverage formula was a temporary measure, on the
belief that the need for the Act would lessen and eventually end. And
therein lied the rub. This was a question of epistemic authority. Who
was in charge of deciding when the need for the VRA would no
longer exist? More generally, who would be in charge of determining
the proper scope of congressional powers under the Reconstruction
Amendments? Who would be in charge, in other words, of determining whether legislation was “appropriate” to enforce the 13th, 14th
and/or 15th Amendments? To Brennan, the Court need only point, as
it did, to rational basis review and defer to the congressional judgment.292 The nod to legislative findings was surplusage, and strategically mistaken.
Months later, Justice Brennan’s fears came to pass. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court confronted the constitutionality of section
4(e) of the Act, which barred the use of literacy tests for persons who
had completed a sixth grade education in Puerto Rico.293 This section
was in direct tension with a recent case, Lassiter v. Northampton,
which upheld the use of literacy tests as legitimate exercises of state
power absent a finding that the tests were used as discriminatory
tools.294 Unfortunately for the Court, the voluminous congressional
record in support of the special provisions of the Act did not encompass section 4(e). Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan deferred to
288.
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the congressional vision of constitutional equality, notwithstanding
the fact that that vision contradicted and displaced the Court’s previously articulated understanding of constitutional equality.295 This is
what Justice Brennan had argued in South Carolina, but Morgan came
one case too late and soon became a historical footnote, a blip in the
Court’s march towards a muscular version of judicial review.
Buried within Morgan’s apparent irrelevance lies an important
lesson. The problem of racial discrimination in voting was too difficult
for any one institution to handle alone. The problem required multiple institutions working in concert towards the same goal. Congress
made the first move, in enacting an aggressive and inventive statute.
It was then up to the justices and the executive to interpret and enforce the statute as needed. And this is precisely what Morgan offered, a clear signal to the political branches that the justices would do
their part to further the promise of constitutional equality.
The effect of the Act was undeniable. Gains in registration and
voting turnout were immediate.296 These gains were made possible in
spite of significant non-compliance on the part of state officials with
some of the demands of the Act.297 This led to an important crossroad for the Act. The special provisions were intended to last for five
years. Should Congress extend them any further? The facts in the
next landmark case, Allen v. State Board of Elections,298 pointed towards an answer. In Allen, the Court examined the scope of the
preclearance provision, and whether specific changes in state law were
subject to preclearance.299 The case put the Court in a bind. The Act
as originally enacted focused on the act of registering and voting.
Some of the changes at issue in Allen and its companion cases, however, were dilutive in nature; that is, eligible voters were able to register and vote, but the state was undervaluing the weight of their
vote.300
Writing for the Court, and turning to the reapportionment cases
for support, Chief Justice Warren argued that the Voting Rights Act
was “aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations
295. Id. at 501.
296. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (1968) at
vii.
297. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Preclearance, Discrimination, and the
Department of Justice: The Case of South Carolina, 57 S.C. L. REV. 827 (2006).
298. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
299. Id. at 563–64.
300. See Allen, 393 U.S. at 550–53.
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which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of
their race.”301 Consequently, Warren concluded that Congress intended that “all changes, no matter how small, be subjected to § 5
scrutiny.”302 Had the Court decided otherwise, the Voting Rights Act
would have succumbed, as prior attempts before it, to the ingenuity
and ill will of local officials’ intent on denying voters of color the right
to a meaningful vote. Allen was thus crucial in the life of the Act,
perhaps its most important moment. After Allen, Congress extended
the special provisions of the Act for another five years and cited this
ruling as a leading reason for doing so.303
The Court continued its expansive and flexible approach to in its
interpretations of the language of the Act for the next decade. The
Court meant what it wrote: every change, no matter how small, must
be precleared under § 5. Though the statutory language specifically
covered changes with which votes “could comply,” the Court expanded the reach of § 5 to annexations and redistricting plans,
changes with which voters need not comply.304 The Court also demanded preclearance of a state rule demanding unpaid leave of employees seeking elective office, due to its “potential for
discrimination.”305 Similarly, the Court also expanded the reach of
jurisdictions covered by the law. Though the Act explicitly applied
only to states or jurisdictions that registered voters, the Court expanded its reach to include political units that did not have registration responsibilities.306 For the first decade of the Act, though there
were certainly blips,307 the Court was a willing partner in the project
begun by Congress in 1965.
By 1980, only three justices remained from the Court that first
upheld the constitutionality of the Act in South Carolina.308 Under301. Id. at 565.
302. Id. at 568.
303. See Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings on H.R. 4249, H.R. 5538, and Similar Proposals before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 4 (1969). (“Section
5 was intended to prevent the use of most of these devices. But apparently the States rarely
obeyed the mandate of that section, and the Federal Government was too timid in its enforcement. I hope that the case of Allen v. State Board of Elections, decided by the Supreme Court
on March 3, 1969, is the portent of change.”).
304. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 390–91 (1971); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S.
526, 536 (1973).
305. See Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978).
306. See United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110 (1978); Dougherty Cnty.
Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978).
307. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
308. These were Justices Brennan, Stewart, and White.
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standably, the Court’s posture began to change. In City of Mobile v.
Bolden,309 the Court held that § 2 of the Act inflexibly tracked the
constitutional standard under the 15th Amendment. This was not an
irrational or even illogical position. There was much evidence from
the legislative record, as well as the language of § 2, to support such a
conclusion.310 But importantly, that decision signaled that the era of
partnership and cooperation was coming to an end. It is true that the
partnership continued, to a point. Two years later, Congress extended
the special provisions of the Act and took the chance to overturn City
of Mobile, offering its own interpretation.311 The Court subsequently
upheld this new standard, even though it was in direct conflict with the
constitutional standard. This was a question the Court must face
sometime in the future: could Congress, under its power to enforce
the 15th Amendment’s intent standard, implement an effect standard?
Though many justices have raised the question in concurring and dissenting opinions through the years312, the Court itself is yet to take up
the question squarely.
Through the 1990’s and into the new century, cracks in the voting
rights edifice continued to show. In Presley v. Etowah County,313 for
example, the Court declined to extend preclearance coverage to
changes in the distribution of authority of an elected body after an
election had taken place.314 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy
reminded his audience that only changes with respect to voting were
covered by § 5.315 Consequently, governance changes, or what Justice
Kennedy labeled the “internal operation of an elected body,” did fall
under § 5 coverage.316 This case is exemplary of Court’s change in
posture. Had it been willing to do so, the Court could have nestled
the changes in Presley within prior precedents. What happened in
Etowah County, after all, fit perfectly within the historical record.
And as in Allen, the Court in Presley could have interpreted the act of
voting as protected by the Act through its prior voting rights prece309. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
310. See, e.g., Voting Rights: Hearings before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1564, 89th
Cong. 171 (1965) (statement of Sen. Dirksen) (arguing that section 2 “is a restatement, in effect,
of the 15th Amendment”).
311. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
312. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the Hands
of a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 142-43 (2010)
313. 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
314. Id. at 510.
315. Id. at 500.
316. Id. at 503.
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dents. Had it done so, governance questions could have easily come
under the purview of the Act.317 But this was a different Court.
This was a Court that swung the voting rights pendulum hard in
the opposite direction from the Warren Court. These were the Shaw
cases, where the Court invented a new cause of action in the name of
its colorblind vision.318 These were also the Bossier Parrish cases,
where the Court offered narrow interpretations of § 5 of the Act, and
which Congress saw fit to partially reverse when it extended the special provisions of the Act for another twenty-five years.319 Thus, in
2008, when plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act, in Northwest Austin v. Holder,320 the stage was set. Would
the Act survive its latest constitutional challenge?
It did, but only for a time.
VII.

THE FIFTH MOMENT: UNWINDING THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTURE
OF VOTING RIGHTS LAW

“Things have changed in the South,” Chief Justice Roberts unanimously declared in Northwest Austin, and he had the evidence to
prove it.321 “Voter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare.
And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.”322 On
this evidence, the Chief Justice implicitly asked, what else was left for
the “temporary” VRA to do? Moreover, the Chief continued, the
“statute’s coverage formula is based on data that is now more than
thirty-five years old, and there is considerable evidence that it fails to
account for current political conditions.”323 One can almost hear the
Chief Justice explicitly asking the question that is implicit in his Northwest Austin discourse—whether there is any useful purpose to maintaining an outmoded regulatory regime that has already achieved its
317. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1705, 1716–19 (1993); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reynolds Reconsidered, 67 ALA. L. REV. 485, 520 (2015).
318. Karlan, supra note 317, at 1736–37.
319. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
320. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
321. Id. at 202.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 203.
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public policy aims, especially in light of the purported “federalism
costs” imposed by the statute.324
But the Court didn’t go where its own words appeared to take it.
Like Courts before it, the Roberts Court could also interpret the clear
language of the law creatively, in furtherance of its own institutional
goals. Specifically, in Northwest Austin, the Court interpreted the
Act’s bail out provision—which allowed covered jurisdictions to apply
for exit from coverage—to include the plaintiffs, a local utility district
in Texas.325 The Court so concluded in the face of statutory language
that only applied to states or political subdivisions that registered voters.326 The utility district in Northwest Austin was neither, yet the
Court argued that to hold otherwise and keep the utility district under
coverage would raise a serious constitutional question.327 And rather
than face that serious question, the Court expanded the language of
the Act.
Northwest Austin raised a puzzle for students of the Court. Why
lecture the legal public about the improved state of race relations only
to then avoid the obvious constitutional question through a creative, if
unpersuasive, reading of the statutory language? The Court made its
intentions clear in the next case, Shelby County v. Holder.328 Shelby
County marks the death of the Voting Rights Act as a superstatute.329
Specifically, the Court struck down the Act’s coverage formula, which
identified the states that were subject to the Act’s special provisions,
and it effectively neutered the existing preclearance regime.330 This is
significant; it signals that the partnership between Congress and the
Executive, on one side, and the Court, on the other side, has disintegrated. With Shelby County and its herald, Northwest Austin, the
Court is cautiously dismantling the most important civil rights statute
in our nation’s history. The strong message of Shelby County is that
the voting rights era—and maybe much more broadly, the civil rights
era—as we have known it, is over.
Thus, the question with which we close this Essay: where does
voting rights policy go from here? Not surprisingly, voting rights activ324. We examine the question of the Act’s federalism costs in Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer, Race, Federalism, and Voting Rights, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 113, 127 (2015).
325. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 210–11.
326. Id. at 205–06.
327. Id. at 211.
328. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
329. See Charles & Fuentes-Rowher, supra note 279, at 1391.
330. Id.
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ists called on President Barack Obama and Congress to enact a new
coverage formula.331 Indeed, a few weeks after the Shelby County decision, President Obama convened civil rights leaders to the White
House to reassure them that his Administration is committed to a bipartisan fix for the Act.332 Attorney General Eric Holder, for his part,
promised to use the remaining sections of the VRA to vigorously enforce voting rights policy.333 And as evidence of his commitment, Attorney General Holder filed suit in Texas and asked a lower court to
use section 3(c) of the VRA to once again require the state to preclear
some voting changes.334
As these early responses to Shelby County reveal, many of the
proposed fixes and reactions to the decision reflect an attempt to restore the status quo ante. These early efforts have been aimed at promoting aggressive § 2 litigation, using section 3’s bail-in provision, and
using § 2 cases to craft a new coverage provision. Importantly, these
strategies critically depend upon the continued persistence of racial
discrimination in voting by state actors as the central problem of voting rights policy. This is because the most critical justification for the
VRA has long been the presence, profundity, and persistence of
intentional racial discrimination in voting by state actors. More importantly, modern voting rights law and policy is held together by a consensus that clearly understood the reality, pervasiveness, and extent of
racial discrimination by state actors in democratic politics. This antidiscrimination consensus is the foundation upon which modern voting
rights law is built.
However, rightly or wrongly, the Court no longer believes that
intentional racial discrimination by state actors remains the dominant
problem of democratic politics.335 The decision in Shelby County is
clear evidence that the Court’s current conservative majority believes
that the regulatory model that has undergirded modern voting rights
policy and has been in place for almost fifty years is no longer tenable
because of what it views as the backward-looking nature of the VRA’s
statutory scheme. A statutory scheme that, in its view, is focused on
rooting out intentional discrimination by state actors as that discrimination manifested itself in the middle of the twentieth century. Shelby
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
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County is the expression of the Court’s dissent from the current voting
rights model; Shelby County announces the dissolution of the framework that has guided voting rights law and policy of the past halfcentury.
CONCLUSION – SLOUCHING TOWARD UNIVERSALITY
In the wake of Shelby County, voting rights scholars and activists
are searching for a way forward. This brief jaunt through our history
can provide us some lessons for the future. First, Shelby County must
be viewed as part of our ongoing dialectic on the scope and importance of voting and political participation. Though the history of
franchise in American law and politics is generally one of expansion, it
is also one of entrenchment. Progress is sometimes followed by backlash. From the founding and through the 21st Century, the history of
the right to vote is a history of ebbs and flows, successes and failures;
of voter expansion yet voter suppression; of racial empowerment yet
racial retrenchment. This is a history of continuous political struggle.
Second, progress is a function of legal and social consensus, which
is itself is the product of social movements. The VRA came about
because of the civil rights movement. Though as lawyers, we often
focus on the role of the Court and litigation, we should pay attention
as much attention to social movements and the political process as
providing the framework for exploring the scope and content of political participation. Thus, we ought to be looking to the political process
and to a political movement to build a new way forward.
Third, the history of the voting in the United States is one that
has been fought on a largely racialized battlefield. Additionally, since
at the least the advent of the VRA, we have filtered most of our disputes with respect to political participation through a racial prism.
One, as of yet unexplored or underexplored, benefit of this racial
prism is that it has led us as a society to view restrictions on voting and
political participation as unusual and less acceptable both on normative and instrumental grounds. On normative grounds, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to justify barriers to voting and political participation. On instrumental grounds, as we search for a path forward
from the voting rights, racialized model, we might find the only available path is one in which we view voting and political participation as a
positive and universal right.
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